Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
- 197 Downloads
A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.
KeywordsPrima Facie Justify Belief Mental Life Evil Demon Propositional Justification
For helpful comments and conversation on a draft of this paper, I thank Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Kevin McCain, Matthew McGrath, Andrew Moon, Thomas Senor, an audience at the 2015 Alabama Philosophical Society Conference, and two anonymous referees. I revised this paper while supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust. The opinions expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust.
- Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2011). Replies. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Frise, M. (2015). Epistemology of memory. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (Eds.), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-mem/.
- Frise, M. (manuscript a). Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Google Scholar
- Frise, M. (manuscript b). Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Google Scholar
- Fisher, R. P., & Edward, R. (1992). Memory-enhancing techniques for investigative interviewing: The cognitive interview (Vol. xi). Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, Publisher.Google Scholar
- Goldman, A. I. (2011). Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism’s troubles, reliabilism’s rescue package. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Harman, G. (1986). Change in view. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Koutstaal, W., & Schacter, D. L. (1997). Inaccuracy and inaccessibility in memory retrieval: Contributions from cognitive psychology and neuropsychology. In P. S. Appelbaum, L. A. Uyehara, & M. R. Elin (Eds.), Trauma and memory: Clinical and legal controversies (pp. 93–137). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and epistemic justification. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
- McGrath, M. (2013). Phenomenal conservatism and cognitive penetration: The bad basis counterexamples. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Mitchell, K., & Johnson, M. (2000). Source monitoring: Attributing mental experiences. In E. Tulving & F. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Poston, T. (2016). Acquaintance and skepticism about the past. In B. Coppenger, & M. Bergmann (Eds.), Intellectual assurance: Essays on traditional epistemic internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Roediger, H., & McDermott, K. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(4), 803–814.Google Scholar
- Russell, B. (1921/1995). The analysis of mind. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
- Schacter, D. L. (2002). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and remembers. Boston: Mariner Books.Google Scholar
- Senor, T. D. (2009). Epistemological problems of memory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memoryepisprob/.
- Williamson, T. (2007). On being justified in one’s head. In M. Timmons, J. Greco, & A. Mele (Eds.), Rationality and the good: Critical essays on the ethics and epistemology of Robert Audi. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar