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Erkenntnis

, Volume 81, Issue 6, pp 1173–1194 | Cite as

Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes

  • Claudio Calosi
  • Matteo Morganti
Original Article

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses (at least those who do not simply deny the metaphysical import of empirical data and their proposed interpretation) claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence.

Keywords

Ontological Commitment Bohmian Mechanic Composite Object Plural Logic Supervenience Basis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We want to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their detailed, careful and insightful comments which led to substantive revision and improvement. C.C acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation, Project No. BSCGI0_157792. M.M acknowledges funding from FIRB 2012, Project No. F81J12000430001.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of NeuchatelNeuchâtelSwitzerland
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Rome3RomeItaly

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