Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 6, pp 1217–1236 | Cite as

Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty

Original Article
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Abstract

In his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief” (2008), Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s (Analysis 61(3):171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, we will argue that the difference between the two versions of Sleeping Beauty isn’t sufficient for justifying the different verdicts on them. Since this is a counter-intuitive result, we should reject Titelbaum’s theory of de se updating.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) under the Grant funded by the Korean government (NRF-2012S1A5B5A01025359). I would like to thank David Etlin, Byeondoek Lee, Chris Meacham, Ilho Park, Wolfgang Schwarz, and Yeongseo Yeo for their comments and assistance. Especially, I owe many thanks to Michael Titelbaum, who kindly gave me a detailed reply to (an earlier draft of) this paper. Finally, I also want to say “Thank you” to my mother Jungsook Kim, who passed away last year.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sunkyunkwan UniversitySeoulSouth Korea

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