, Volume 80, Supplement 2, pp 235–262 | Cite as

Names as Devices of Explicit Co-reference

Original Article


This essay examines the syntax of names. It argues that names are a syntactically and not just semantically distinctive class of expressions. Its central claim is that names are a distinguished type of anaphoric device—devices of explicit co-reference. Finally it argues that appreciating the true syntactic distinctiveness of names is the key to resolving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles that have long been thought to be of a semantic nature.


Noun Phrase Argument Position Distinct Token Complex Demonstrative Attitude Ascription 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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