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Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 3, pp 505–519 | Cite as

The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences

  • Justin TiehenEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.

Keywords

Causal Power Causal Theory Causal Claim Mental Causation Disjunctive Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Puget SoundTacomaUSA

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