Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 3, pp 647–665 | Cite as

On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence

Original Article

Abstract

I argue that coherence is truth-conducive in that coherence implies an increase in the probability of truth. Central to my argument is a certain principle for transitivity in probabilistic support. I then address a question concerning the truth-conduciveness of coherence as it relates to (something else I argue for) the truth-conduciveness of consistency, and consider how the truth-conduciveness of coherence bears on coherentist theories of justification.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Nicholaos Jones, Ted Poston, Tomoji Shogenji, Joshua Smith, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and questions on earlier versions of this paper. The completion of this work was financially supported by the Junior Faculty Summer Research Program at Texas Christian University.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas Christian UniversityFort WorthUSA

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