, Volume 79, Supplement 6, pp 1185–1217 | Cite as

Impermissive Bayesianism

  • Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail author
Original Article


This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not succeed.


Rational Agent True Belief High Credence Rational Belief Permission Parity 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Massachusetts, AmherstAmherstUSA

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