Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation
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Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
KeywordsProbability Function Prior Belief Rational Belief Classical Rule Credal State
Thanks to Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz for helpful comments when serving as discussant of the paper for the Erasmus Institute EIPE Research Seminar. Thanks also to the anonymous referees of this journal for detailed and helpful comments. SB's research supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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