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Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Issue 6, pp 1287–1303 | Cite as

Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

  • Seamus BradleyEmail author
  • Katie Steele
Original Article

Abstract

Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.

Keywords

Probability Function Prior Belief Rational Belief Classical Rule Credal State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz for helpful comments when serving as discussant of the paper for the Erasmus Institute EIPE Research Seminar. Thanks also to the anonymous referees of this journal for detailed and helpful comments. SB's research supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ludwig-Maximilians-UniversitätMunichGermany
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodLondon School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)LondonUK

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