Advertisement

Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 4, pp 727–738 | Cite as

A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation

  • Jan SprengerEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.

Keywords

Malaria Content Part Harmonic Oscillator Model Entire Theory Logical Entailment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Borsboom, D., & Haig, B. D. (2013). How to practise Bayesian statistics outside the Bayesian church: What philosophy for Bayesian statistical modeling? British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66, 39–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Carnap, R. (1950). The logical foundations of probability. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  3. Dietrich, F., & Moretti, L. (2005). On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science, 72, 403–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Fitelson, B., & Hawthorne, J. (2010). How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens. In E. Eells, & J. Fetzer (Eds.) The place of probability in science (pp. 247–275). New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. (2012). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics in the social sciences. In H. Kincaid (Ed.) Oxford handbook of the philosophy of the social sciences (pp. 259–273). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. (2013). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with discussion). British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66, 8–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Gemes, K. (1993). Hypothetico-deductivism, content and the natural axiomatisation of theories. Philosophy of Science, 60, 477–487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Gemes, K. (1997). A new theory of content II: Model theory and some alternatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26, 449–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Gemes, K. (1998). Hypothetico-deductivism: The current state of play. Erkenntnis, 49, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Gemes, K. (2006). Content and Watkins’ account of natural axiomatizations. Dialectica, 60, 85–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Glymour, C. (1980a). Theory and evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Glymour, C. (1980b). Discussion: hypothetico-deductivism is hopeless. Philosophy of Science, 47, 322–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Hempel, C. G. (1943). A purely syntactical definition of confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8, 122–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Hempel, C. G. (1945/65). Studies in the logic of confirmation. In Aspects of scientific explanation, (pp. 3-46). New York: The Free Press. Reprint from Mind 54, 1945.Google Scholar
  15. Huber, F. (2008). Hempel’s logic of confirmation. Philosophical Studies, 139, 181–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Kuipers, T. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Mayo, D. G. (1996). Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Nicod, J. (1925). Le problème logique de l’induction. Paris: Alcan.Google Scholar
  19. Popper, K. R. (1934/71). Logik der Forschung, 3rd edn. Tübingen: Mohr.Google Scholar
  20. Schurz, G. (1991). Relevant deduction. Erkenntnis, 35, 391-437.Google Scholar
  21. Schurz, G. (2005). Bayesian H-D confirmation and structuralistic truthlikeness: Discussion and comparison with the relevant-element and the content-part approach. In R. Festa (Ed.) Logics of scientific discovery. Essays in debate with Theo Kuipers (pp. 141–159). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  22. Whewell, W. (1847). Philosophy of the inductive sciences, founded upon their history, Vol. II. London: Parker.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations