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Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 143–154 | Cite as

Disagreement Without Error

  • Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes
Article

Abstract

The idea that there can be cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which neither party is making a mistake, is frequently discussed in connection with relativist views in philosophy of language. My goal is to argue that we can make sense of faultless disagreement without being committed to any form of relativism if we recognise that disagreement sometimes involves attitudes other than belief, such as desires or preferences. Furthermore, this way of making sense of faultless disagreement allows us to avoid some of the problems that have been raised in connection with relativist accounts of faultless disagreement.

Keywords

Relevant Case Alternative Account Propositional Truth Relativist Account Truth Predicate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St AndrewsSt Andrews, FifeScotland, UK

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