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Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 121–142 | Cite as

Doxastic Disagreement

  • Teresa Marques
Article

Abstract

This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be accommodated by theoretical positions that allow for the compatibility (at the same world) of the content of different doxastic attitudes.

Keywords

Propositional Truth Simple View Evaluative Judgment Doxastic Attitude Gradable Adjective 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Manuel García-Carpintero, Dan Zeman, Giuliano Torrengo, Jérôme Dokic and other members of audiences at: Logos-Jean Nicod workshop in Paris (October 2009), LanCog Analytic Philosophy Seminar (December 2009), workshop Relativism and Disagreement in Bologna (May 2011), workshop Disagreements in Tartu (August 2011), and LanCog-Logos workshop in Barcelona (October 2011), for helpful discussion and comments. Special thanks also to Daniel Cohnitz. Work supported by the projects: Contextualism, Relativism and Practical Conflicts and Disagreement, EuroUnders/0001/2010 (part of the collaborative research project: Communication in Context, Shared Understanding in a Complex World, supported by the European Science Foundation within the EUROCORES EuroUnderstanding programme), and Online Companions to Problems of Analytic Philosophy, PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010 (both funded by FCT); and the projects The Nature of Assertion: Consequences for Relativism and Fictionalism Code: FFI2010-16049, PERSP - Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts, Code: CSD2009-00056 (Spain), and by the AGAUR of the Generalitat de Catalunya (2009SGR-1077)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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