Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 73–100

There’s Something Funny About Comedy: A Case Study in Faultless Disagreement

Article

Abstract

Very often, different people, with different constitutions and comic sensibilities, will make divergent, conflicting judgments about the comic properties of a given person, object, or event, on account of those differences in their constitutions and comic sensibilities. And in many such cases, while we are inclined to say that their comic judgments are in conflict, we are not inclined to say that anybody is in error. The comic looks like a poster domain for the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. I argue that the kind of theory that does the best job of accounting for the appearance of faultless disagreement is a de se version of a response-dependence account, according to which thinking that x is funny is self-attributing a property of the type, being disposed to have R to x in C.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA
  2. 2.Arché Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsScotland

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