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Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 11–30 | Cite as

Merely Verbal Disputes

  • C. S. I. Jenkins
Article

Abstract

Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds on their strengths.

Keywords

Subject Matter Linguistic Difference Belief Content Verbal Dispute Wooden Duck 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank an audience at the University of Leeds, especially Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Daniel Elstein, Jason Turner, Pekka Varynen and Robert Williams; an audience at the University of Nottingham, especially Peter King, Matthew Kennedy and Stephen Mumford; and an audience at the University of St Andrews, especially Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler and Jonathan Schaffer. I am also grateful to the anonymous referees who commented on versions of this paper, and to David Chalmers and especially Daniel Nolan for detailed comments and discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.VancouverCanada

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