Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 1–10 | Cite as

Disagreements

Article

Abstract

This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles in this collection.

References

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  2. Hume, D. (1757). Of the standard of taste. In T. H. Green & T. H. Grose (Eds.), Essays moral, political and literary by David Hume (Vol. 1, pp. 266–284), reprint of the new edition 1882 (1964 Scientia Verlag Aalen).Google Scholar
  3. James, W. (1904). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. Filiquarian Publishing, LLC., 2007.Google Scholar
  4. MacFarlane, J. (2007). Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 17–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. MacFarlane, J. (ms). Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. (Accessed on-line at http://johnmacfarlane.net/books.html on August 2012).

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TartuEstonia
  2. 2.LisbonPortugal

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