, Volume 78, Issue 6, pp 1337–1345

Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief

Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9425-0

Cite this article as:
Lynch, K. Erkenn (2013) 78: 1337. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9425-0


Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele’s proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in this account, and should also make a Mele-style deflationist think more carefully about the kinds of motivational factors operating in self-deception.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, National University of IrelandMaynoothIreland

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