Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 73–94 | Cite as

A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis’ Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals

Original Article
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Abstract

I question here the differentiation of kinds as substantive universals in Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics, by taking up, for the argument’s sake, two extreme approaches on kind differentiation and kind change, a Heraclitan and a Spinozan approach. I show that, as things currently stand, Heraclitanism or Spinozism about kinds is consistent with the broad tenets of Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics of kinds.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Work for the present paper was undertook during my doctoral studies at Lancaster University, for which I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (fees doctoral bursary, awarded July 2007, Ref. No. 2007/135148/Lancaster University) and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (doctoral scholarship, awarded July 2007). As always, I am very grateful to Rachel Cooper for advice and encouragement. I also thank the two anonymous referees of this journal for their suggestions and criticism.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Paris-Sorbonne, Centre Léon Robin (UMR 8061)Paris Cedex 05France

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