, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 73–94

A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis’ Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals

Original Article


I question here the differentiation of kinds as substantive universals in Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics, by taking up, for the argument’s sake, two extreme approaches on kind differentiation and kind change, a Heraclitan and a Spinozan approach. I show that, as things currently stand, Heraclitanism or Spinozism about kinds is consistent with the broad tenets of Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics of kinds.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Paris-Sorbonne, Centre Léon Robin (UMR 8061)Paris Cedex 05France

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