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Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 5, pp 1185–1196 | Cite as

The Argument from Abomination

  • Michael Veber
Original Article

Abstract

The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I don’t know whether the conclusion of that argument is true”. Two standard replies to the argument from abomination are raised. It is argued that the logical abominations open new holes in both.

Keywords

Tree Ring Actual World Perceptual Experience Truth Table Logical Abomination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper benefited from conversation with John Collins, Nick Georgalis, Jay Newhard and Michael Pendlebury. I also thank two anonymous referees for their remarks on earlier versions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyEast Carolina UniversityGreenvilleUSA

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