The Argument from Abomination
The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I don’t know whether the conclusion of that argument is true”. Two standard replies to the argument from abomination are raised. It is argued that the logical abominations open new holes in both.
KeywordsTree Ring Actual World Perceptual Experience Truth Table Logical Abomination
This paper benefited from conversation with John Collins, Nick Georgalis, Jay Newhard and Michael Pendlebury. I also thank two anonymous referees for their remarks on earlier versions.
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