Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 161–182 | Cite as

Can Opposing Dispositions be Co-instantiated?

Original Paper

Abstract

Is it possible that one and the same object x has opposing dispositions at the same time? One’s first reaction might be that it is evidently impossible. On the assumption that x is incombustible, it seems to follow that it is not combustible. Surprisingly enough, however, it is claimed that there are a number of examples in support of the possibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions. In this paper, I will bring under scrutiny some of the examples and come to the conclusion that none of them achieve the desired goal. This will give support to the initial intuition that opposing dispositions cannot be co-instantiated by one and the same object at the same time.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentKyung Hee UniversitySeoulKorea

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