Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 4, pp 869–880 | Cite as

Using Natural-Kind Essentialism to Defend Dispositionalism

Original Article

Abstract

Marc Lange and Ann Whittle have independently developed an important challenge to dispositionalism, arguing that dispositions are reducible to primitive subjunctive facts. I argue in reply that by pairing dispositionalism with a certain version of natural-kind essentialism, their objection can be overcome. Moreover, such a marriage carries further advantages for the dispositionalist. My aim is therefore two-fold: to defend dispositionalism, and to give the dispositionalist some new motivation to adopt natural-kind essentialism.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy & Religious StudiesLivingstone CollegeSalisburyUSA

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