Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 5, pp 977–978 | Cite as

Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Original Paper

Abstract

In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Birkbeck, University of LondonLondonUK

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