, Volume 78, Issue 5, pp 977–978

Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0

Cite this article as:
Pelling, C. Erkenn (2013) 78: 977. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0


In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Birkbeck, University of LondonLondonUK

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