, Volume 78, Issue 4, pp 823–832 | Cite as

Reducing Truth Through Meaning

  • Robert TruemanEmail author
Original Article


Horwich has attempted to combine an anti-reductionist deflationism about sentential truth with a reductionist theory of meaning. Price has argued that this combination is inconsistent, but his argument is fallacious. In this paper I attempt to repair Price’s argument.


Relational Reduction Naturalistic Property Naturalistic Feature Propositional Truth Reductive Base 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Thanks to Timothy Button, Christina Cameron, Paul Horwich, Steven Methven, Michael Potter, Huw Price, Adam Stewart-Wallace and everyone at the Serious Metaphysics Group.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fitzwilliam CollegeUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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