, Volume 78, Issue 3, pp 523–546

Pragmatics in Carnap and Morris and the Bipartite Metatheory Conception

Original Paper


This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the “logic of science”) supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the “behavioristics of science”). A claim to this effect was recently met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap’s formalist conception of philosophy by the pragmatist Morris, but that this initiative failed and that Carnap showed no interest in it. To defend the original claim this paper provides an analysis of Carnap and Morris on the subject matter of pragmatics in order to show that and how Carnap adopted Morris’s proposals in so far as they agreed with bipartite metatheory conception.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy, School of Social SciencesUniversity of ManchesterManchesterUK

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