, Volume 78, Issue 2, pp 451–468

Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth

Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6

Cite this article as:
Howat, A.W. Erkenn (2013) 78: 451. doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6


This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, FullertonFullertonUSA

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