, Volume 76, Issue 1, pp 115–120 | Cite as

Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?

  • Christoph KelpEmail author
Original Article


This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.


High Stake Epistemic Position Knowledge Attribution Classical Invariantism Error Possibility 
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Thanks to Michael Blome-Tillmann, Mikkel Gerken, Blake Roeber and the audience of the 2008 Joint Session for helpful comments on various earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to the referees of Erkenntnis for their patience with and relentless efforts to improve this piece. This work was funded by a postdoctoral fellowship with Research Foundation—Flanders.


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  3. DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Rysiew, P. (2009). Epistemic contextualism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. (Spring 2009 edn).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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