Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?
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This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.
KeywordsHigh Stake Epistemic Position Knowledge Attribution Classical Invariantism Error Possibility
Thanks to Michael Blome-Tillmann, Mikkel Gerken, Blake Roeber and the audience of the 2008 Joint Session for helpful comments on various earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to the referees of Erkenntnis for their patience with and relentless efforts to improve this piece. This work was funded by a postdoctoral fellowship with Research Foundation—Flanders.
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