, 75:203 | Cite as

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

  • Gerhard Schurz
Original Article


The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.


Belief Revision Propositional Variable Relevant Element Conjunctive Part False Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



For valuable help I am indepted to Theo Kuipers, Erik Olsson, Graham Oddie, Roberto Festa and Gustavo Cevolani.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of DuesseldorfDuesseldorfGermany

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