, Volume 74, Issue 3, pp 383–397 | Cite as

Believing For a Reason

  • John Turri
Original Article


This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.


Perceptual Experience Deviance Problem Cognitive Trait Coffee Machine Musical Ability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



In writing this paper, I have accumulated too many debts to be confident that I recall them all. With apologies to those I may have forgotten, I thank Jason Baehr, Ali Eslami, Ben Fiedor, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Allan Hazlett, Adam Leite, Sharifa Mohamed, Michael Pace, Jim Pryor, Bruce Russell, Mark Schroeder, Ernest Sosa, Jerry Steinhofer, Angelo Turri, and three anonymous referees for Erkenntnis.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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