, Volume 75, Issue 1, pp 147–150 | Cite as

A Note in Defence of Ratificationism

Original Article


Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.


  1. Egan, A. (2007). Some counterexamples to causal decision theory. The Philosophical Review, 116(1), 93–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The logic of decision (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  3. Rabinowicz, W. (1989). Stable and retrievable options. Philosophy of Science, 56(4), 624–641.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Weirich, P. (1986). Decisions in dynamic settings. In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association (pp. 438–449).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and the History of TechnologyRoyal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

Personalised recommendations