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Erkenntnis

, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp 69–79 | Cite as

An Argument for the Existence of Tropes

  • Anna-Sofia MaurinEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.

Keywords

Actual World Infinite Regress Complex Entity Internal Nature Truthmaker Theorist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

A very different version of this paper was presented in Nottingham at the 2008 conference Themes in the Metaphysics of D. M. Armstrong. I would like to thank the audience at that conference (especially David Armstrong) for good comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank Johan Brännmark as well as two anonymous referees from this journal for their extremely helpful comments. This research was partly funded by The Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, as part of the research project Ontological Justification: From Appearance to Reality.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Filosofiska InstitutionenLund UniversityLundSweden

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