An Argument for the Existence of Tropes
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That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.
KeywordsActual World Infinite Regress Complex Entity Internal Nature Truthmaker Theorist
A very different version of this paper was presented in Nottingham at the 2008 conference Themes in the Metaphysics of D. M. Armstrong. I would like to thank the audience at that conference (especially David Armstrong) for good comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank Johan Brännmark as well as two anonymous referees from this journal for their extremely helpful comments. This research was partly funded by The Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, as part of the research project Ontological Justification: From Appearance to Reality.
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