Erkenntnis

, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp 37–52 | Cite as

There’s No Future in No-Futurism

Original Article

Abstract

In two recent papers Button (Analysis 66:130–135, 2006, Analysis 67:325–332, 2007) has developed a particular view of time that he calls no-futurism. He defends his no-futurism against a sceptical problem that has been raised (by e.g. Bourne in Aust J Phil 80:359–371, 2002) for a similar “growing block” view—that of Tooley (Time, tense, and causation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). If Button is right, then we have an important third option available to us: a half-way house between presentism and eternalism. If, on the other hand, the criticism of Tooley-style “Growing-Block” views holds, then we are left with just presentism and eternalism. In this paper I show that Button’s defence fails.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I’m very grateful to Ross Cameron, Mark Jago, Carrie Jenkins, Daniel Nolan and Neil Sinclair. The paper has improved in light of conversations I’ve had with each of them. I’m also very grateful to three referees for this journal. One referee, in particular, gave extremely extensive and helpful comments that have helped me to radically improve the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamUK

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