, Volume 74, Issue 2, pp 225–240

Temporal Parts and Time Travel

Original Research

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-010-9231-5

Cite this article as:
Effingham, N. Erkenn (2011) 74: 225. doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9231-5


This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BirminghamEdgbaston, BirminghamUK

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