, Volume 72, Issue 3, pp 337–351 | Cite as

The Dynamics of Indexical Belief

  • Moritz Schulz
Original Article


Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of Bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.


Contextual Change Credence Function Epistemic Possibility Initial Credence Uncertain Evidence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This paper has greatly profited from discussion with Heather Demarest, Nick Haverkamp, Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Kroedel, Alexander Steinberg, Alastair Wilson, and the participants of the MLE seminar 2006 in Oxford at which I first learned about the Sleeping Beauty problem. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their extensive and very helpful comments. Special thanks are due to Benjamin Schnieder for numerous help with various earlier drafts of the paper. Research for the present paper has been made possible through the generous support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany

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