, Volume 71, Issue 3, pp 425–429 | Cite as

Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller

Critical Discussion


Material Object Temporal Part Definite Description Material Entity Mass Noun 



For comments on earlier versions, I would like to thank Paul Egré, Kathrin Koslicki, Øystein Linnebo, Kristie Miller, Frédéric Nef, Thomas Sattig, Luc Schneider, Benjamin Spector, Mark Steen, and two anonymous referees. I also wish to express my gratitude to Florence and Henry, at whose cottage this and other works were partly written.


  1. Gillon, B. (1992). Towards a common semantics for English count and mass nouns. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15(6), 597–639.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hawley, K. (2001). How things persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Markosian, N. (2004). Simples, stuff, and simple people. The Monist, 87(3), 405–421.Google Scholar
  4. Miller, K. (2008). Essential stuff. Ratio, 21(2), 55–63.Google Scholar
  5. Miller, K. (2009). Stuff. American Philosophical Quarterly, 46(1), 1–18.Google Scholar
  6. Nicolas, D. (2008). Mass nouns and plural logic. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(2), 211–244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Olson, E. (2006). Temporal parts and timeless parthood. Noûs, 40(4), 738–752.Google Scholar
  8. van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Varzi, A. (2009). Mereology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2009 ed.).
  10. Zimmerman, D. W. (1995). Theories of masses and problems of constitution. Philosophical Review, 104, 53–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut Jean Nicod, Pavillon Jardin, ENS-EHESS-CNRSParisFrance

Personalised recommendations