Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism
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Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.
This paper would have not have been epistemically possible had it not been made metaphysically possible through actual discussion with Kevin Falvey, Nathan Salmon, Anthony Brueckner, C. Anthony Anderson, David Chalmers, Fritz Allhoff, Jesse Steinberg, Dylan Dodd, and Richard Glatz. In addition, I would like to thank Thomas Grundmann and the participants of the 2006 Summer School in Philosophy at the University of Cologne for engaging discussion and commentary on this paper. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for outstanding comments that greatly improved this paper.
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