No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory
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I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory. I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
KeywordsDecision theory Game theory
I would like to thank two anonymous referees, Hans Rott, Adam Elga, and those present when I gave this paper as a talk in Regensburg for very useful comments.
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