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Erkenntnis

, Volume 68, Issue 2, pp 277–297 | Cite as

No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory

  • Frank Arntzenius
Original Article

Abstract

I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory. I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.

Keywords

Decision theory Game theory 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank two anonymous referees, Hans Rott, Adam Elga, and those present when I gave this paper as a talk in Regensburg for very useful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University CollegeOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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