Erkenntnis

, Volume 65, Issue 3, pp 405–426

Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-006-9018-x

Cite this article as:
Royes, S.R. Erkenntnis (2006) 65: 405. doi:10.1007/s10670-006-9018-x

Abstract

Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Logic, History and Philosophy of Science (LOGOS)University of BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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