, Volume 65, Issue 2, pp 185–206 | Cite as

The Concept of Inductive Probability

  • Patrick MaherEmail author


The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it is a mistake to try to replace it with the concept of degree of belief, as is usual today.


Subjective Probability Ordinary Language Total Evidence Physical Probability True Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA

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