Erkenntnis

, Volume 64, Issue 2, pp 223–230

Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-005-3567-2

Cite this article as:
Miller, K. Erkenntnis (2006) 64: 223. doi:10.1007/s10670-005-3567-2
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Abstract

I argue that for those who follow Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three-dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal vagueness.

Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of QueenslandChelmerAustralia

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