European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 43–55 | Cite as

Property is only another name for decentralized creation of knowledge

  • Juan Ramón RalloEmail author


Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl argue in a recent paper that a private property regime is incompatible with allocative efficiency insofar as it allows owners to ask for monopoly prices to potential buyers. In order to remedy this defect without penalizing investment efficiency, they propose to implement a Harberger tax. In this paper we show that the Harberger tax is a mechanism that penalizes the informational investment necessary to reach efficient estimates of the fundamental value of assets and, therefore, a mechanism that move us away from both investment efficiency and allocative efficiency.


Harberger tax Property Efficiency Knowledge 

JEL Classification

D61 D83 H21 


Compliance with ethical standards

Ethical approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

Informed consent

No humans were involved and therefore informed consent was not needed.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad Francisco MarroquinMadridSpain

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