European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 287–311 | Cite as

Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice

Article

Abstract

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a very powerful court compared to other international courts and even national courts of last resort. Observers almost unanimously agree that it is the preliminary references procedure that made the ECJ the powerful court it is today. In this article, we analyze the factors that lead national courts to use the procedure. We add to previous studies by constructing a comprehensive panel dataset (1982–2008) and identify the economic structure, familiarity with EU law, and tenure of democracy as new determinants.

Keywords

European Court of Justice Court behavior Preliminary reference procedure 

JEL Classification

H77 K33 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MunichMunichGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Law & Economics and CESifoUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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