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European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 9–18 | Cite as

Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules

  • André Casajus
  • Helfried Labrenz
  • Tobias Hiller
Article

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze judicial review according to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, §§ 243 et seqq.) and its blocking effect with the help of concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we suggest variable qualified majority rules as ingredients of arrangements which balance the interests of a majority shareholder and of the minority shareholders.

Keywords

Shapley-Shubik index Shapley value Reorganization Ban of registration Application for judical review 

JEL Classification

C71 G32 G34 G38 K10 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank a lot of people for comments on earlier versions of this paper. In particular, we are indebted to Franziska Beltz, Esther Pittroff, Matthias Schmidt, Lothar Tröger, and Harald Wiese.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • André Casajus
    • 1
    • 2
  • Helfried Labrenz
    • 3
  • Tobias Hiller
    • 2
  1. 1.Chair of Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany
  2. 2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Professur für MikroökonomikUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Professur für Externe Unternehmensrechnung und WirtschaftsprüfungUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany

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