De Economist

, Volume 160, Issue 4, pp 413–438

Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

Open Access
Article

Abstract

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a “spike” in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. This gives some workers an incentive to not immediately start working after they have found a job. Instead they wait until their benefits expire. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.

Keywords

Unemployment benefits Spikes 

JEL Classification

J22 I31 J16 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Tilec, CentERTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Economics, CentERTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  3. 3.CEPRLondonUK
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia
  5. 5.CESifoMunichGermany
  6. 6.IZABonnGermany

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