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De Economist

, Volume 154, Issue 2, pp 197–249 | Cite as

Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications

  • Emiel Maasland
  • Sander Onderstal
Article

Abstract

This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it considers are: How much do bidders bid in commonly studied single-object auctions? How efficient are these auctions? How much revenue do they generate? Which single-object auction maximizes the seller’s expected revenue? What is the best way to auction incentive contracts? And, how efficient and complex are multi-object auctions?

Keywords

auctioning incentive contracts efficiency equilibrium bidding multiple objects optimal auctions revenue equivalence 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Erasmus University RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.University of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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