Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 72, Issue 4, pp 1041–1068 | Cite as

Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach

  • Kelly M. CobournEmail author
  • Gregory S. Amacher
  • Robert G. Haight


We use a Nash bargaining framework to examine scope for bargaining in invasive species problems where spread depends on the employment of costly controls. Municipalities bargain over a transfer payment that slows spread but requires an infested municipality to forgo nonmarket benefits from the host species. We find that when the uninfested municipality has a relative bargaining power advantage, bargaining may attain the first-best solution. However, in many cases a short-term bargaining agreement is unlikely to succeed, which suggests a role for higher levels of government to facilitate long-term agreements even when the details are left to municipalities to negotiate.


Bioeconomics Biological invasions Emerald ash borer Negotiation Optimal control Pest spread 

JEL Classification

Q57 Q23 C71 

Supplementary material

10640_2018_238_MOESM1_ESM.docx (21 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 21 kb)


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Forest Resources and Environmental ConservationVirginia TechBlacksburgUSA
  2. 2.USDA Forest Service Northern Research StationSaint PaulUSA

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