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Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 67, Issue 3, pp 505–533 | Cite as

(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

  • Andreas LangeEmail author
  • Claudia Schwirplies
Article

Abstract

We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.

Keywords

International environmental negotiations Climate policy Strategic delegation Equity rules Fairness principles 

JEL Classification

D63 H41 Q54 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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