Advertisement

Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 58, Issue 3, pp 353–372 | Cite as

Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

  • Keith S. Evans
  • Quinn Weninger
Article

Abstract

We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.

Keywords

Search Information sharing Bayesian learning  Fisheries cooperatives 

JEL Classification

Q22 D8 

Supplementary material

10640_2013_9701_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (170 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 169 KB)

References

  1. Abbott J, Wilen JE (2010) Voluntary cooperation in the commons? Evaluating the sea state program with reduced form and structural models. Land Econ 86(1):131–154Google Scholar
  2. Alchian A, Demsetz H (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization. Am Econ Rev 62(5):777–795Google Scholar
  3. Andersen R (1980) Hunt and conceal: information management in newfoundland deep-sea trawler fishing. In: Tefft SK (ed) Secrecy: a cross-cultural perspective. Human Science Press, New York, pp 205–228Google Scholar
  4. Carpenter J, Seki E (2005) Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama Bay. IZA DP No. 1697. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), BonnGoogle Scholar
  5. Costello C, Deacon R (2007) The efficiency gains from fully delineating rights in an ITQ fishery. Mar Res Econ 22(4):347–361Google Scholar
  6. Costello C, Gaines SD, Lynham J (2008) Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321(5896):1678–1681CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Costello C, Polasky S (2008) Optimal harvesting of stochastic spatial resources. J Environ Econ Manage 56(1):1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Curtis RE, McConnell KE (2004) Incorporating information and expectations in fishermen’s spatial decisions. Mar Resour Econ 19:131–143Google Scholar
  9. Fama EF (1980) Agency problems and the theory of the firm. J Politi Econ 88:88–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Fama EF, Jensen MC (1983) Separation of ownership and control. J Law Econ XXVI:301–325CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Freixas X, Kihlstrom R (1984) Risk aversion and information demand. In: Boyer M, Kihlstrom RE (eds) Bayesian models in economic theory. North-Holland Pub. Co., New York, pp 93–104Google Scholar
  12. Gaspart F, Seki E (2003) Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence. J Econ Behav Organ 51(1):51–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Gatewood J (1984) Cooperation, competition, and synergy: information-sharing groups among Southeast Alaskan salmon seiners. Am Ethnol 11(2):350–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Gibbons R (1992) Game theory for applied economists. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar
  15. Gilman EL, Dalzell P, Martin S (2006) Fleet communication to abate fisheries bycatch. Mar Policy 30:360–366CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Haynie AC, Hicks RL, Schnier KE (2009) Common property, information, and cooperation: commercial fishing in the Bering Sea. Ecol Econ 69:406–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Heintzelman M, Salant SW, Schott S (2009) Putting free-riding to work: a partnership solution to the common-property problem. J Environ Econ Manage 57:309–320CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Holland D (2010) Markets, pooling and insurance for managing bycatch in fisheries. Ecol Econ 70:121–133CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Holland D, Jannot JE (2012) Bycatch risk pools for the us west coast groundfish fishery. Ecol Econ 78:132–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kaffine DT, Costello C (2011) Utilization of spatially connected renewable resources. BE J Econ Anal Policy 11:15 (Contributions) doi: 10.2202/1935-1682.2714
  21. Kitts A, Edwards S (2003) Cooperatives in US fisheries: realizing the potential of the fishermen’s collective marketing act. Mar Policy 27:357–366CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Knapp G (2008) The Chignik salmon cooperative, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 504. In: Townsend R, Shotton R, Uchida H (eds) Case studies in fisheries self-governance. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, pp 335–348Google Scholar
  23. Lynham J (2006) Schools of fishermen: a theory of information sharing in spatial search. Department of Economics, UCSB Working PaperGoogle Scholar
  24. MacCall AD (1990) Dynamic geography of marine fish populations. University of Washington Press, SeattleGoogle Scholar
  25. Mangel M, Clark C (1986) Search theory in natural resource modeling. Nat Resour Model 1:1–54Google Scholar
  26. Marcoul P, Weninger Q (2008) Search and active learning with correlated information: empirical evidence from mid-Atlantic clam fishermen. J Econ Dyn Control 32(6):1921–1948CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. McConnell K, Price M (2006) The lay system in commercial fisheries: origin and implications. J Environ Econ Manage 51(3):295–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Morris S (1995) The common prior assumption in economic theory. Econ Philos 11:227–253CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) catch share policy. Available online: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/index.htm
  30. New England Fishery Management Council (2010) New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC): final amendment 16 to the northeast multispecies fishery management plan. Available online: http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html
  31. North Pacific Fishery Management Council (2011) (NPFMC) Discussion paper on cooperatives: gulf of Alaska chinook salmon bycatch. Available online at: http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_issues/bycatch/211GOAChinookCoops.pd
  32. Orbach MK (1977) Hunters, seamen and entrepreneurs: the tuna seinermen of San Diego. University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
  33. Palmer CT (1990) Telling the truth (up to a point): radio communication among Maine lobstermen. Hum Org 49(2):157–163Google Scholar
  34. Smith M (2000) Spatial search and fishing location choice: methodological challenges of empirical modeling. Am J Agric Econ 82(5):1198–1206CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Uchida H, Baba O (2008) Fishery management and the pooling arrangement in the Sakuraebi Fishery in Japan. In: Case studies in fisheries self-governance, pp 175–190Google Scholar
  36. Uchida H, Wilen JE (2005) Harvester cooperative. Pooling arrangements and market power. Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, UC Davis Working PaperGoogle Scholar
  37. U.S. Department of Agriculture (2012) United States Department of Agriculture: business and cooperative programs: number of cooperatives and memberships by major business activities 2009. Available online: http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/coops/data.htm
  38. Wilen JE, Richardson EJ (2008) Rent generation in the Alaskan pollock conservation cooperative. In: Case studies in fisheries self-governance, pp 361–368Google Scholar
  39. Williamson O (1975) Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications. The Free Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  40. Wilson J (1990) Fishing for knowledge. Land Econ 66(1):12–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSt. Lawrence UniversityCantonUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsIowa State UniversityAmesUSA

Personalised recommendations