Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 48, Issue 3, pp 413–433 | Cite as

Social Psychology and Environmental Economics: A New Look at ex ante Corrections of Biased Preference Evaluation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet
  • Alexander G. James
  • Stéphane Luchini
  • Jason F. Shogren
Article

Abstract

The field of social psychology explores how a person behaves within the context of other people. The social context can play a substantive role in non-market allocation decisions given peoples choices and values extend beyond the classic market-based exchange institution. Herein we explore how social psychology has affected one aspect of environmental economics: preference elicitation through survey work. We discuss social representation, social isolation, framing through cheap talk, and commitment theory through an oath.

Keywords

Social psychology Commitment Persuasive communication Preference elicitation 

JEL Classification

C9 H4 Q5 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicolas Jacquemet
    • 1
  • Alexander G. James
    • 2
  • Stéphane Luchini
    • 3
  • Jason F. Shogren
    • 2
  1. 1.Centre d’Economie de la SorbonneParis School of Economics and University Paris I Panthéon–SorbonneParisFrance
  2. 2.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of WyomingLaramieUSA
  3. 3.GREQAM-CNRSCentre de la Vieille CharitéMarseille Cedex 02France

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