Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 303–319 | Cite as

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

  • Carolyn FischerEmail author
  • Edwin Muchapondwa
  • Thomas Sterner


This paper formulates a bio-economic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Three agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, outside poachers hunt illegally, and a local community may choose to protect wildlife by discouraging poaching. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency manages hunting quotas.


Bio-economics Benefit sharing CAMPFIRE Conservation Elephants Hunting quotas Poaching Renewable resources Wildlife 

JEL Classification

H1 Q20 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carolyn Fischer
    • 1
    Email author
  • Edwin Muchapondwa
    • 2
  • Thomas Sterner
    • 3
  1. 1.Resources for the Future (RFF)WashingtonUSA
  2. 2.School of EconomicsUniversity of Cape TownCape TownSouth Africa
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsGothenburg UniversityGothenburgSweden

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