Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 395–406 | Cite as

Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?

Open Access
Article

Abstract

In a recent paper, Barrett (Am Econ Rev 96(2):22–25, 2006) reaches the conclusion that in general the answer to the question in the title is no, except for a special case in which technology adoption involves increasing returns (network externalities). We show in this paper that a focus on the R&D phase in the development of breakthrough technologies can also increase the possibilities for cooperation.

Keywords

International environmental agreements Breakthrough technology 

JEL Classification

Q28 C72 F42 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OsloOsloNorway
  2. 2.Department of Economics and TSCTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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