Advertisement

Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp 411–425 | Cite as

Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

  • Carlo Carraro
  • Carmen Marchiori
  • Sonia Oreffice
Article

Abstract

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Minimum participation constraints are particularly frequent in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to “tie their hands” through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This article addresses the above issues by modeling the formation of an international treaty as a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. Both the equilibrium minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories—the coalition size—are determined. This article, by showing that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium, explains the occurrence of minimum participation clauses in most international environmental agreements. It also analyses the endogenous equilibrium size of the minimum participation constraint.

Keywords

Agreements Climate Negotiations Policy Participation rule 

JEL Classification

H0 H4 O3 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46: 878–894Google Scholar
  2. Barrett S (1997) Towards a theory of international cooperation. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Barrett S (2007) Why cooperate? the incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  5. Black J, Levi MD, de Meza D (1992) Creating a good a atmosphere. Minimum participation for tackling the greenhouse effect. Economica 60: 281–293CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Bloch F (1996) Sequential formation of coalition with fixed payoff division. Games Econ Behav 14: 90–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bloch F (1997) Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  8. Botteon M, Carraro C (1997) Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue linkage with heterogeneous countries. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game Theory and the Global Environment. E. Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  9. Carraro C (ed) (1997) International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues. E. Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  10. Carraro C, Marchiori C (2003) Stable coalitions. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  11. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1992) The international protection of the environment: voluntary agreements among sovereign countries. In: Dasgupta P, Maler KG, Vercelli A (eds) The economics of transnational commons. Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  12. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the environment. J Public Econ 52: 309–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1995) Policy coordination for sustainability: commitments, transfers, and linked negotiations. In: Goldin I, Winters A (eds) The economics of sustainable development. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  14. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1998) International environmental agreements. Incentives and political economy. Eur Econ Rev 42: 561–572CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Chander P, Tulkens H (1995) A core-theoretical solution for the design of cooperative agreements on trans-frontier pollution. Int Tax Public Financ 2: 279–293CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Chander P, Tulkens H (1997) The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. Int J Game Theory 26: 379–401Google Scholar
  17. d’Aspremont CA, Jacquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weymark J (1983) On the stability of collusive price leadership. Can J Econ 16: 17–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Diamantoudi E, Sartzetakis E (2006) Stable international environmental agreements: an analytical approach. J Public Econ Theory 8: 247–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Finus M (2003) Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of global and transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H, Tietenberg T (eds) International yearbook of environmental and resource economics, 2002/3. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  20. Finus M (2008) Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: insights, critical remarks and future challenges. Int Rev Environ Resour Econ 2: 1–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Ray D, Vohra R (1997) Equilibrium binding agreements. J Econ Theory 73: 30–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Ray D, Vohra R (1999) A theory of endogenous coalition structure. Games Econ Behav 26: 286–336CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Rubio S, Ulph A (2006) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxf Econ Pap 58: 233–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Rutz S (2001) Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements, Working paper 01/22, Centre for Economic Research, SFIT, ZurichGoogle Scholar
  25. Tulkens H (1998) Cooperation versus Free-riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game theory and the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham. Also in Carraro C (ed) Governing the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002Google Scholar
  26. Yi SS (1997) Stable coalition structures with externalities. Games Econ Behav 20: 201–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Yi SS (2003) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Asurveyofthepartitionfunctionapproach. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlo Carraro
    • 1
  • Carmen Marchiori
    • 2
  • Sonia Oreffice
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Venice, CEPR, CEPS, CESifo and Fondazione ENI E. MatteiVeniceItaly
  2. 2.London School of Economics and Fondazione ENI E. MatteiVeniceItaly
  3. 3.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain

Personalised recommendations