Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 241–271 | Cite as

Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

  • Magdalena Margreiter
  • Matthias Sutter
  • Dennis Dittrich
Article

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups.

Keywords

common pool resources experiment heterogeneity voting 

JEL classifications

C91 C92 D70 D74 H41 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Baland, J. M., Platteau, J. P. 1999‘The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management’World Development27773788CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bardhan, P., Dayton-Johnson, J. 2001

    ‘Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons Management in Large-scale Multivariate Research’

    Ostrom, E.Dietz, Th.Dolsak, N.Stern, P.Stonich, S.Weber, E. eds. The Drama of the Commons.National Academy of Sciences PressWashington, DC87112
    Google Scholar
  3. Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., Varian, H. 1986‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods’Journal of Public Economics292549CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Brandts, J., Schram, A. 2001‘Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach’Journal of Public Economics79399427CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Carpenter, J. P. 2000‘Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action’Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics156661683Google Scholar
  6. Chan, K. S., Mestelman, S., Moir, R., Muller, R. A. 1999‘Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods’Experimental Economics2530Google Scholar
  7. Dayton-Johnson, J., Bardhan, P. 2002‘Inequality and Conservation of the Local Commons: a Theoretical Exercise’Economic Journal112577602CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Fischbacher, U. (1999), Z-tree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiment, Working paper No. 21,Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.Google Scholar
  9. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E. 2001‘Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence From a Public Goods Experiment’Economics Letters71397404CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Fischer, M.-E., Irlenbusch, B., Sadrieh, A. 2004‘An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment’Journal of Environmental Economics and Management48811836CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Hackett, S. 1992‘Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-pool Resources’Journal of Theoretical Politics4325342Google Scholar
  12. Hackett, S., Schlager, E., Walker, J. M. 1990‘The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators’Journal of Environmental Economics and Management2799126CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Heckathorn, D. D. 1993‘Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives’American Sociological Review58329350Google Scholar
  14. Isaac, M., Walker, J. 1988‘Communication and free-riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism’Economic Inquiry24585608Google Scholar
  15. Keser, C., Winden, F. 2000‘Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods’Scandinavian Journal of Economics1022339CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Olson, M. 1965The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of GroupsHarvard University PressCambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  17. Ostrom, E. 1990Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionCambridge University PressCambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  18. Ostrom, E. 1992‘Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation SystemsICS PressSan FranciscoGoogle Scholar
  19. Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Gardner, R. 1992‘Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-governance is Possible’American Political Science Review86404417Google Scholar
  20. Rogers, W. H. 1993‘sg17: Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples’Stata Technical Bulletin131923Google Scholar
  21. Shepsle, K. 1979‘Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models’American Journal of Political Science232759Google Scholar
  22. Shepsle, K., Weingast, B. R. 1981‘Structure induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’Public Choice37503519CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Sutter, M., Weck-Hannenmann, H. 2003‘On the Effects of Asymmetric and Endogenous taxation in Experimental Public Goods Games’Economics Letters795967CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Varughese, G., Ostrom, E. 2001‘The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal’World Development29747765CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Vedeld, T. 2000‘Village PoliticsHeterogeneity, Leadership and Collective Action’. Journal of Development Studies36105134Google Scholar
  26. Walker, J. M., Gardner A., Herr, Ostrom, E. 2000‘Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes’Economic Journal110212234CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Wooldridge, J. M. 2002Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel DataMIT PressCambridge, MAGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Magdalena Margreiter
    • 1
  • Matthias Sutter
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dennis Dittrich
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Public EconomicsUniversity of InnsbruckInnsbruckAustria
  2. 2.Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic SystemsJenaAustria

Personalised recommendations